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11.1 Introduction
In chapter 3 we described our basic treatment of foreign trade. The
standard version of the model uses constant elasticity excess demand
functions to describe the merchandise trade of the rest of the world with
the United States. The standard version of the model has two variants.
The first variant deals only with net trade flows. In this case, none of the
nineteen commodities can be exported and imported simultaneously.
However, as described in section 3.6, this treatment conflicts with the
empirical observation that many products are crosshauled. We allow
for crosshauling under the gross trade flows variant of the model. The
gross trade flows variant seems to us to be the more realistic one.
Consequently, all of the results reported until now were obtained using
the constant elasticity gross flows formulation.
There are two reasons for examining more sophisticated models of
trade behavior. First, we would like to be able to analyze realistically
those tax policy issues that are believed to have their principal effects on
the foreign sector. Second, we would like to see how sensitive the findings
of our earlier chapters are to the specification of the external sector.
In this chapter we develop some alternative treatments of the interna-
tional economy. The first of these is a formulation in which we treat
certain imports as imperfect substitutes for comparable domestic prod-
ucts. We then present two formulations that model capital mobility
between the United States and the rest of the world. The first of these
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formulations introduces international flows of capital services which de-
pend on the difference between U.S. and foreign rates of return to
capital. An elasticity parameter controls the sensitivity of the capital
service flows to rate-of-return differentials. The second of these formu-
lations is similar, but involves capital goods rather than capital services.
In order to, evaluate the sensitivity of the model to these different
specifications, we analyze the integration of corporate and personal
income taxes (see chapter 8) and the introduction of a consumption tax in
the United States (see chapter 9) under each of these alternative formula-
tions. We also consider the effects of adopting alternative forms of a
value-added tax (VAT) in the United States. We consider VATs of both
the income and consumption type, and on both the destination and origin
basis. We have delayed looking at the VAT until now, partly because
much of the debate on the VAT has centered on foreign trade issues.
It does not appear that the formulation with imperfectly substitutable
imports changes our results very much. The welfare gain from adoption
of a consumption tax is between 10 and 20 percent lower under this new
formulation. The results for corporate tax integration are virtually iden-
tical to those of our standard case. Much greater differences arise as a
result of the new models of capital flows. The consumption tax is no
longer a very attractive policy under either of the models with capital
flows. In the capital service flow version, the consumption tax leads to
very substantial losses. The intuition behind these results is that, if the
world capital market functions well, a policy such as a consumption tax
will not significantly increase the U.S. capital stock.
Whereas the consumption tax no longer leads to large welfare gains
under the international capital flow formulations, the efficiency gains
implied by corporate tax integration are increased. Integration causes the
after-corporate-tax rate of return to capital to increase, thus leading to
capital inflows. Under some specifications of the capital service flow
model, the welfare gain from corporate tax integration is twice as great as
it is with the standard model. However, considerable uncertainty exists
about the value of some of the key parameters of the capital flow models.
Therefore, we provide fairly detailed sensitivity analyses.
We analyze two types of value-added taxes, each at a 10 percent rate.
Value-added taxes of the consumption type lead to substantial welfare
gains under all four variants of the model. Income-type VATs lead to
considerably smaller welfare gains in most cases. The results for the VAT
models are fairly sensitive to the type of equal yield replacement tax,
since a 10 percent VAT generates a great deal of revenue.
In sections 11.2 through 11.4 we present our alternative models of the
foreign sector. In section 11.5 we discuss the linkage between foreign
trade issues and tax policy design. The following section includes the
results of simulations using various formulations of the external sector.205 Models of the Foreign Sector
These include a brief review of the results from the standard version of
the model, as well as sensitivity analyses with respect to the elasticity
parameters that control the shape of the offer surface in our basic con-
stant elasticity formulation.
11.2 A Model of Trade with Imperfectly Substitutable Imports
Our first alternative specification of the external sector separates im-
ports into two broad categories, depending on whether they are perfect
or imperfect substitutes in production for domestically produced in-
termediate goods.
In the basic version of the model we treat all imports as perfect
substitutes in production for producer goods made in the United States.
We then represent these imports as a negative component of final de-
mand. Consequently, every additional unit of import of producer good i
reduces the gross output requirement of industry i by one unit. Industries
demanding intermediate goods from industry / are assumed to be indiffer-
ent as to whether those goods are produced at home or imported.
We now consider a model specification that allows some imports to be
imperfect substitutes for domestic goods in production. Under this spec-
ification we introduce a single new aggregated import commodity, which
enters the production structure as an imperfectly substitutable input. This
specification invokes the Armington assumption, since it assumes that a
qualitative difference exists between the imported input and any domes-
tic inputs used in production (Armington 1969).
The foreign excess demand equations are now
and
(11.3) R = RfJ
where Mt is the supply of imports in the /
t
h industry, Et is that industry's
export demand, and e is the exchange rate. Equation (11.3) is the supply
function for the import commodity. The R in equation (11.3) can be
taken to stand for resources. We treat R like the other factors of produc-
tion, capital and labor. The demand for R is derived from production
requirements. We should also note that M? in equation (11.1) and E? in
equation (11.2) may represent either gross or net trade flows in the base
case where all prices and the exchange rate are unity.206 Chapter Eleven
The trade balance condition is now





Then, substituting (11.1), (11.2), and (11.3) into (11.4), and using the






(11.8) Mi = M?PM^
(11.9) Ei = E?l
7.
(11.10)
As in chapter 3, these are the reduced form or trade-balance-compen-
sated import supply and export demand equations. They provide a con-
stant elasticity set of excess demand functions to describe trade behavior.
With this formulation we also must modify the production structure to
incorporate the imported resource. In the previous version of the model,
the production function for each sector could be written as
(11.11) Q
where the a,y (i = 1,..., n) are the fixed intermediate input requirements
per unit of output, x?; are the intermediate inputs, VA(-, •) is the CES
value-added function for sector / with capital (Kj) and labor (Ly) as
inputs, and aOj is the requirement of value added per unit of output.207 Models of the Foreign Sector
Under this new specification, the production function is
I
I x x 1
—J[VA(Kh Lj), R], -^ ,... ,-^ ,
where / is a CES or Cobb-Douglas function for each sector, and aOj- now
represents the requirements of the resource/value-added composite per
unit of output.
The solution procedure takes advantage of the separability of the
production structure, as in the basic version of the model. First, we
calculate the cost-minimizing proportions of capital and labor that each
industry should use in its value-added function. Using this information we
can then find the cost-minimizing proportions of domestic-factor value
added (VA) and imported resources (R) for each industry. Except for
this, there are no further fundamental differences between our proce-
dures under this version of the model and our procedures in the basic
version.
This specification presents us with an additional data requirement. In
chapter 4 we described our procedures for using the U.S. input-output
tables. In order to install the version of the model with imperfectly
substitutable imports, we went back to the input-output tables and iden-
tified a row of imports by industry. In table 11.1 we show the quantities of
Table 11.1 Ordinary (Perfectly Substitutable) Imports and Armington
(Imperfectly Substitutable) Imports in 1973 (in millions of dollars)
Sector
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries
Mining
Crude petroleum and gas
Construction
Food and tobacco
















































































ordinary imports and imperfectly substitutable imports that are used in
the 1973 base year. The division of the imports in each industry between
ordinary imports and Armington imports seems reasonable. Industries
such as food and tobacco, lumber, furniture, and services contain high
proportions of Armington imports. (One thinks of Danish furniture and
Norwegian sardines, which are qualitatively different from their Amer-
ican counterparts.) On the other hand, industries with more homog-
eneous outputs, such as crude petroleum and gas and transportation
equipment, use ordinary imports for the most part.
We also need to specify a substitution elasticity between U.S. value
added and R. For this we use estimates of the aggregate price elasticity of
import demand for the United States. As our central case value we use
1.7 to represent the pure substitution effect between domestic value
added and imported resources. However, we do not believe that this
should be treated as an extremely precise estimate. Therefore, we will
perform sensitivity analyses with respect to this parameter by using the
values of 0.5, 1.0, and 3.0.
11.3 A Simple Model of International Capital Flows
In our model of international capital flows we add an additional con-
sumer to the model. This consumer is "the foreigner" who is endowed
with large quantities of those commodities that the United States im-
ports, and with a large amount of capital services. In the benchmark year
the foreigner's endowment of each import commodity is usually set at five
times the benchmark level of imports of that commodity by the United
States, while the foreigner's capital services endowment is five times the
U.S. capital services endowment in the benchmark. In order to analyze
the sensitivity of the model, we have varied the magnitudes of the
foreigner's endowments of import goods and capital services. We assume
that the foreigner "consumes" most of his endowments; that is, most of
these import goods and capital services are used by the foreign economy
rather than sold or rented to the United States. In the benchmark, in
particular, we assume that the foreigner sells just the observed amount of
imports (one-fifth of his endowment) to the U.S. economy and rents no
capital services to the United States. Thus, the foreigner consumes his
entire endowment of capital services. Loosely speaking, this treatment
might mean that these capital services are foreign resources that provide
output to the foreigner directly.
As U.S. prices change with a tax change, however, the foreigner alters
his behavior. If the U.S. rental price of capital increases above the
benchmark level, the foreigner will "rent" some of his endowment to be
used in U.S. production (i.e., there will be a capital inflow from the
perspective of the United States). On the other hand, if the U.S. rental209 Models of the Foreign Sector
price of capital were to fall below the benchmark level, the foreigner
would "rent" U.S. capital for his foreign consumption (i.e., there will be
a capital outflow from the U.S. perspective).
This behavior is specified as
(11.13) WK-XK=WKP*
K,
where WK is the capital service endowment of the foreigner, XK is capi-
tal services rented to the United States by the foreigner (or rented from
the United States if XK is negative), and EK is an elasticity param-
eter controlling capital flow responses in the model. PK is the rental
rate of capital in the United States. Since PK = 1 in the
benchmark, the benchmark value of XK is zero.
The critical parameters in this formulation are the ratio of WK to the
U.S. capital service endowment (5 in our central case analysis) and EK.
EK should be negative to give the capital service flow responses we
require, although there does not seem to be a consensus as to what value
to use. We highlight two values of EK\ —1.0 and —0.5. For sensitivity
analysis we also use values of 0.0, —0.1, and —4.0 for EK.
Equation (11.13) thus determines capital service flows in the model,
once factor prices are known. A two-stage procedure is involved in
determining foreign behavior. We first determine XK from PK. Once XK
is known, we can calculate the amount of income the foreigner has left
over for expenditure on all other goods. For simplicity we specify a
Cobb-Douglas function for the foreigner's expenditure on all other
goods. We use benchmark data to determine the weights for this Cobb-
Douglas function.
It might be interesting to evaluate the welfare of the foreigner, but we
do not do so. As before, our welfare calculations only deal with the U.S.
population, corrected for population growth. Even though this version of
the model is more complicated than earlier versions, it is still basically
true that our treatment of the foreign sector merely closes the model. In
this connection it is worthwhile to note that we do not derive equation
(11.13) from any explicit model of the utility-maximizing behavior of the
foreigner. The literature now contains several completely specified multi-
country general equilibrium models. In these models the behavior of
consumers, producers, and governments in each of several countries is
specified explicitly and symmetrically. (For a survey of these models, see
Shoven and Whalley 1984).
Our work in this area is motivated in part by the recent debate about
the world capital market between Arnold Harberger on one side and
Martin Feldstein and Charles Horioka on the other. This debate is
important because of its implications for policy evaluation using general
equilibrium tax models. In a world with a perfect, frictionless interna-
tional capital market, the domestic choice between an income and con-210 Chapter Eleven
sumption tax would have little effect on the aggregate domestic employ-
ment of capital. Despite the fact that an income tax discourages saving by
U.S. consumers, and thus tends to discourage capital formation, the rest
of the world would provide U.S. industry with capital until its rate of
return were equal to the world level. However, an origin-based tax such
as the U.S. corporation income tax would still be distortionary, affecting
both the amount of capital in the economy and its allocation across
industrial sectors. In his 1978 and 1980 papers, Harberger finds that there
"seems to be no strong and systematic tendency for rates of return to be
high in countries with a low capital stock per worker." He takes this as
evidence for the existence of a reasonably well-functioning world capital
market. Feldstein and Horioka (1980) observe a high correlation be-
tween the saving of countries and their levels of investment. This leads
them to argue that there are severe restrictions on the operation of the
world capital market. Harberger (1978) challenges these results by show-
ing that this correlation is much lower for less-developed countries than
for the OECD countries studied by Feldstein and Horioka. However,
Harberger does back away from the position that the world capital
market functions with perfect freedom and great speed. In a passage
quoted by Feldstein (1982), Harberger says:
My own intuition does not want to accept the notion that increments of
investment activity are in all or nearly all countries effectively 100
percent "financed" by funds flowing in from abroad, and that incre-
ments in saving simply spill out into the world capital markets. I find
the analogy to a hydraulic system with perhaps a viscous fluid, in which
the pipes are partially clogged, and in which some vessels are separated
by semipermeable membranes, to be more consonant with my image of
the world than the alternative analogy to a hydraulic system where the
water flows freely through the system and, essentially instantaneously,
finds the same level everywhere. (1980, p. 336)
Thus, in their most recent exchange, Feldstein and Harberger seemed
to be converging to the view that, while there is some pressure towards
equalizing the rates of return to capital across world markets, this
equilibration is incomplete, and even the partial movements observed do
not occur instantaneously. The main focus of the debate seems now to be
on their differing views about the speed of the adjustment. Feldstein
argues that, "the tendency toward equalization must be measured in
decades rather than months or even years" (1982, p. 4). Harberger seems
to argue that the long run is shorter than this.
We can capture the key aspects of this debate by altering EK, the
elasticity parameter for the demand for capital services by foreigners. We
find, unfortunately, that our model results are fairly sensitive to the value
of this parameter. Finally, let us note that we always use the basic
constant elasticity formulation of foreign trade along with the new models
of capital markets described here and in the next section.211 Models of the Foreign Sector
11.4 A Model with Capital Purchases
In the model of section 11.3 the foreigner is endowed with a large
amount of capital service which he "rents" to the United States if the
U.S. offers a higher rental price. If the rental price in the United States
falls, the foreigner rents capital from the United States. While this is a
step toward including world capital markets in our model, it fails to
capture important aspects of foreign investment.
Under this specification a capital inflow involves a financial outflow
(the United States must make the rental payments). However, it may be
that the more likely response to high rates of return in the United States
would be direct foreign investment in the U.S. In this case the foreigner
would purchase U.S. capital goods, rather than rent them, providing the
United States with an immediate financial inflow. Rather than receive
immediate financial compensation, the foreigner accumulates a claim on
the future earnings of the capital acquired by these purchases.
This behavior can be incorporated in our model by using a somewhat
different representation of the foreigner. The initial U.S. capital endow-
ment of the foreigner is taken to be zero. The foreigner, however, can
acquire United States capital by purchasing the saving good (the six-
teenth consumer good, which is a fixed proportion portfolio of real
investment goods). He will do this if the expected rate of return on U.S.
investments rises above the benchmark level. The foreigner is interested
in the rate-of-return net of the corporation income tax, the corporation
franchise tax, and property taxes. If the U.S. rate of return should fall,
the foreigner may sell foreign capital to domestic savers. Once again, we
do not model the production structure of the rest of the world. Instead,
the foreigner simply "consumes" foreign capital, as in section 11.3.
This formulation is reasonably complex in terms of modeling. There
are now two kinds of capital goods—foreign and domestic. The two types
of capital offer separate (although conceivably identical) rates of return.
Initially, domestic consumers own only domestic capital and the for-
eigner owns only foreign capital. The demand functions are structured
such that the foreigners will save in the United States only if the U.S. rate
of return rises above the foreign rate, whereas the U.S. consumers will
purchase foreign capital service endowments only if the U.S. rate of
return falls below the foreign rate. While the U.S. rate of return is
endogenous in the model, the foreign rate is usually set at the benchmark
rate, although it can be influenced by certain tax policies of the United
States.
1
1. For example, in this model the foreign rate of return is affected by a U.S. policy that
changes the percentage of U.S. consumers' saving that can be deducted from taxable
income. Such a policy alters the after-tax price of saving to U.S. consumers, whether the
saving is made at home or abroad. Consequently, the policy affects the foreign rate of return
to U.S. consumers of saving abroad.212 Chapter Eleven
Saving behavior in the United States stems from the same demand
functions as in our standard model, except that it involves not just a
domestic saving good but a composite saving good aggregated over
domestic and foreign saving goods. For each household,
(11.14) S = QS
D + (1-Q)S
F,
where 5 is total saving, and S
D and S
F are domestic and foreign saving
goods acquired. 0 is a distribution parameter that depends on the relation
between domestic and foreign rates of return (r
Fand r
us) according to:











us are rates of return to U.S. consumers. Because of
differences in marginal tax rates, r
F and r
us each will differ across the
twelve consumer groups. We account for these differences in the model,
although for convenience we speak of a single r
F and r
us in this discus-
sion.
In the benchmark, r
F = r
us and 6 = 1 (U.S. households buy no foreign
capital goods). In the solution of the model, 6 for each household is used
to form a composite price for saving goods, which enters household
budget constraints. Household utility functions only have an interpreta-
tion over composite goods, since we do not investigate the real character-
istics of assets (such as risk) that would account for a diversified portfolio
by savers. Once again, the literature only provides us with a very rough
guide as to what a reasonable value of Zx might be. After considerable
experimentation with different values for this parameter, we have de-
cided to highlight the results from simulations with Zx = 250 and Zx =
50. We also provide further sensitivity analyses for values of Zx outside of
this range.
The foreigner's saving in the United States, Sj}5, is given by
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 rF) , \irF > rF.
Here, rF
s and rF are U.S. and foreign rates of return expected by the
foreigner. Because U.S. consumers are not treated identically in the tax
system, r
us generally differs from rF
s, and r
F from rF.
A two-stage procedure similar to that in section 11.3 applies here.
First, we determine the foreigner's investment behavior. Then, the for-
eigner's expenditures on other goods are allocated according to a Cobb-
Douglas utility function. In this case our dynamic sequencing of equilibria
takes account of previous investment abroad in determining the capital
service endowments in each country in each period. In our central case
analysis we set Z2 equal to 50,000 and Z3 equal to 0.5. We perform213 Models of the Foreign Sector
sensitivity analyses on the values of Z2 and Z3 when we simulate corpo-
rate tax integration. The parameters Z2 and Z3 are irrelevant to the study
of the consumption tax, since the domestic price of capital drops in that
case and the foreigner does not save in the United States. Similarly, Zx is
irrelevant to the case of corporate tax integration, because the domestic
rate of return increases in that case and domestic consumers do all of their
saving at home.
11.5 Taxes and Foreign Trade
In this section we explore some of the issues linking international trade
to the design of taxes and explore how they can be analyzed using the
different external sector formulations in the U.S. general equilibrium
model. First, we explore the foreign trade linkage to the value-added tax.
Next, we consider the difference between broadly based taxes that use
the origin basis and those that use the destination basis. Finally, we
discuss some issues connected with factor mobility and tax structure.
11.5.1 The Value-Added Tax and Foreign Trade
Value-added taxes (VATs) have been used in Europe for almost three
decades, but have never been used in the United States. Nevertheless,
there is a great deal of interest in adopting a VAT in the United States.
Much of this interest was sparked by bills introduced by Representative
Al Ullman (D-Ore.), the former chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee.
The development of the tax in Europe follows from the difficulties in
France, Germany, and other countries with the turnover taxes that
existed before the war and in the period immediately following. Under a
tunover tax each firm pays a tax on the total value of sales, with no credit
given for the taxes already paid on intermediate inputs. Turnover taxes
lead to "cascading," with the taxes compounding when the production
process involves several stages or market exchanges. The turnover tax
provided an incentive for firms to integrate vertically in order to avoid
taxes. The turnover taxes were administered on a destination basis, thus
it became very difficult to agree on the appropriate way to rebate taxes on
export items. European nations were forced to negotiate annually in
order to agree on mean tax rates by product. These negotiations were a
rough attempt to take account of international differences in the degree
of vertical integration.
In the early 1950s the French began to seek ways to avoid these
problems of the turnover tax. They were attracted to the value-added tax
for administrative reasons.
2 A value-added tax can be administered in a
2. Value added is simply the summation of returns to labor and capital by industry. We
can calculate it as the total value of sales by industry minus all material inputs.214 Chapter Eleven
number of different ways. The tax can be applied directly to value added
(as a composite payroll and capital income tax) or indirectly as a tax on
the total value of sales less the cost of material inputs. Most European
countries now administer the tax by the so-called credit method, under
which a company is taxable on the total value of sales but receives a credit
for all taxes paid on intermediate inputs purchased in earlier stages of the
production process. During the initial debate on the VAT in France, it
was pointed out that, under a retail sales tax or a turnover tax, tax
administrators typically collect the largest fraction of the tax from a large
number of relatively small retail outlets. This contrasts with the value-
added tax. Since the VAT is collected as the value of the product accumu-
lates through the production process, a significant portion of the tax
would be collected from a relatively small number of large primary
producers. Thus, the VAT was represented as being administratively
more cost efficient than other taxes, since tax administrators found it
easier to collect a large amount of tax from a small number of producers.
This type of argument was extended as the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC) moved into the field of tax design. In the initial stage of
economic harmonization, the nations of the EEC eliminated all tariffs
between member countries and adopted a common external tariff. It was
then argued that further progress toward economic union would require
the member nations to harmonize their tax systems. By the middle 1960s
the nations of the EEC became convinced that they should adopt a
common system of indirect taxation. The system eventually adopted
involved a value-added tax for each member nation.
As administered in the EEC, the VAT is a tax of the consumption type,
under which the tax incorporates complete deductibility of products
purchased for business use, including capital goods. In its broadly based
variant, where all value added is taxed at the same rate, this tax is to be
thought of as equivalent to a retail sales tax on consumption.
An alternative form of a value-added tax is what Carl Shoup (1969)
calls a VAT of the income type. Under this arrangement the firm can only
take deductions for depreciation. The base of this tax is equivalent to that
of a flat personal income tax without any exemptions. However, the tax is
collected from firms rather than from individuals. Finally, Shoup suggests
a VAT of the product type, where there is no deduction for depreciation.
The base of this type of VAT is the same as GNP.
11.5.2 The Origin and Destination Basis Issue and International Trade
Another feature of the VAT in Europe is that it is levied on a destina-
tion basis, under which exports leave the country tax free, while imports
are taxed when they enter. This contrasts with the origin basis, under
which the tax is applied at the site of manufacture. The choice between
the origin basis and the destination basis for indirect taxes has attracted a215 Models of the Foreign Sector
good deal of attention over the last fifteen to twenty years. This issue is a
clear example of the link between tax design and foreign trade concerns.
Most of the major trading partners of the United States have broadly
based indirect taxes that operate on the destination basis. We have
already mentioned the VAT in the European Economic Community. In
addition, Japan has a commodity tax and Canada has a federally operated
manufacturers' sales tax.
A common argument repeated over the years is that the United States
is placed at a disadvantage by this tax treatment, since the taxes on
American firms are not rebated on export items, whereas import items
enter the United States tax free. Such a disadvantage might exist in the
very short run. However, we believe that this argument does not stand up
to close scrutiny in the context of long-run equilibrium.
One of the prominent themes within the academic literature is that
with broadly based taxes, the destination basis and the origin basis do not
differ in their effects in long-run equilibrium (provided that no discrim-
ination arises in the tax rates) (see Johnson and Krauss 1970). With
flexible exchange rates, a movement between the two bases can be offset
by an exchange rate change that leaves the real characteristics (trade
flows) unchanged. With fixed exchange rates, changes in domestic price
levels (and implied changes in domestic money stocks) preserve the real
equilibrium. Thus, in long-run equilibrium, a movement from one tax
basis to another is equivalent to a purely monetary phenomenon with no
implications for real economic behavior.
This can be shown as follows.
3 As a simplification we consider two
countries, each producing a single good, X1 in 1, X2 in 2. Px and P2 represent the cost-covering competitive producer prices of products in
each country, in domestic currencies. Let e be the exchange rate between
currency 1 and 2. Demands for products in each country depend on
relative prices in domestic currencies: X\ are exports by 1 to 2; X\ are
exports by 2 to 1. For each country, balance in international payments
requires that the domestic currency value of outflows equal the domestic
currency value of inflows. We consider a single consumer in each country
and assume that all tax revenues are redistributed in lump-sum form. We
can consider three regimes: (1) no tax, (2) a destination-based tax in
country 1, and (3) an origin-based tax in country 1. If we examine the
balance-of-payments conditions (from the viewpoint of either country)
and relative commodity prices (in domestic currencies) under each of
these regimes, we will see that the relative commodity prices that deter-
mine consumer behavior remain unchanged and the same real trade flows
will satisfy the balance-of-payments conditions in all three cases. The
truth of this proposition is independent of the exchange rate regime. The




Balance-of-Payments Conditions and Relative Prices under Various
Tax Regimes
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information upon which these conclusions are based is summarized in
table 11.2. The superscripts NT, D, and O refer to the no-tax, destina-
tion-tax, and origin-tax regimes. Relative prices are unchanged in all
regimes, and the same X\, X\ satisfy the balance-of-payments conditions
under all regimes if,
.., a .,, _D _ aNT pD _ pNT pD _ pNT
m 1?, with flexible e -e , rl - r1 , r2 - f2 , (11<
1
 } exchange rates: e° = (1 + tx)e
NT, P? = P?
T, P° = Pi
T\
.,, c , ryD _ ONT pD _ pNT pD _ pNT
, IQ\ or with fixed e -e , f1 - fx , r2 - f2 , ^ ' ' exchange rates: e° = e
NT, P? = Pf
r/(1 + h), P? = P%
T.
Thus, the introduction of a broadly based tax or a change in basis is
equivalent to a purely monetary change. It does not affect real trade flows
and thus does not restrict trade.
A similar argument is sometimes made regarding international tax
unions. The argument is that it is necessary for the members of such a
union (such as the members of the EEC) to have similar tax rates in order
for the tax distortions between them to be removed. However, a careful
analysis will show once again that the no-tax equilibrium will be pre-
served, even when two countries have different tax rates. This is true
regardless of whether the origin base or the destination base is used. The
same conclusion also holds if one country uses the origin basis and the
other uses the destination basis.
We model origin-based taxes as factor taxes and destination-based
taxes as sales taxes, because this is the easiest way to capture the differ-
ence between an origin-based and a destination-based tax. A factor tax is
origin based because it applies to exports but not to imports. A sales tax is
destination based because it applies to imports but not to exports. For
broadly based taxes the neutrality of movements between the two tax
bases applies, since we use a classical general equilibrium approach.
11.5.3 Taxes and International Capital Mobility
Another area of concern is the tax treatment of foreign investment
inflows and outflows. The tax laws governing foreign investment are very217 Models of the Foreign Sector
complex. Typically, profits will originate in one country (the "host"
country), and a portion of these profits will be paid through a parent
company in another country (the "destination" country) to the stock-
holders. The profits originating in the host country are usually subject to
four separate layers of tax. First, the host country levies a corporate tax.
Next, the host country levies a withholding tax on dividends and interest
paid. This tax is designed to substitute for personal income tax in the host
country. The next tax is the corporate tax in the destination country,
followed by the personal income tax in the destination country.
These four layers of tax can be a very heavy burden. As a result, most
nations grant some sort of tax relief to the income from foreign invest-
ment. Such tax relief can be granted unilaterally or can result from
negotiated tax treaties. The United States unilaterally allows corpora-
tions a credit for taxes paid abroad. The United States also has a number
of treaties that deal symmetrically with profits flowing into or out of the
United States. Under these treaties the withholding tax rate on profits
paid in either direction is the same.
Now that we have described the existing arrangements for the tax
treatment of foreign investments, let us discuss the economic incentives
that influence such arrangements. Some of these incentives are described
by Koichi Hamada (1966). Figure 11.1 is based on the diagram in Hama-
da's paper. In this static, two-country model, capital in country 1 is
measured from left to right, and capital in country 2 ismeasured from
right to left. Country 1 has a fixed capital endowment of Ku and country 2
has a fixed endowment of K2. In each country the marginal value product
of capital schedule is downward sloping. These schedules are shown as
MVPKl and MVPKr The capital endowments will be used most efficiently
if the value of the marginal product is equal in both countries. In general,
K2
Fig. 11.1 International capital flows in the Hamada model.218 Chapter Eleven
this condition will not be met unless there is an international flow of
capital. In figure 11.1, this flow is of ^
/7rfrom country 1 to country 2, in
the free-trade situation where there are no taxes or other impediments to
the movement of capital.
Hamada's point is that each country has an incentive to use tax policy
to interfere with this capital flow. First, let us look at the situation from
the point of view of country 1—the capital-exporting country. The mar-
ginal cost to country 1 of exporting capital abroad is the foregone mar-
ginal value product of capital in 1, given by the MVPKl curve. However,
the marginal revenue obtained by exporting capital is not equal to the
marginal value product of capital schedule in country 2. This marginal
value schedule determines the average return received by capital sent
abroad. Therefore, as more units of capital are exported by 1 to 2, the
price received on all units sent abroad is bid down. The marginal value
product schedule of country 2 is the average revenue schedule to country
1; thus from the point of view of country 1 the marginal revenue schedule
MRX is more steeply sloped than the marginal value product of capital
schedule in country 2.
Thus, if country 1 can restrict the capital flow and, through a tax,
extract the differential between the marginal value product in country 1
and country 2, country 1 would be better off than in the free-trade
situation. It would then receive a larger share of a smaller total output but
would still be better off.
Figure 11.2 conveys much the same information as figure 11.1, except
that it uses a separate diagram for each nation. The rate of return at which
the marginal products are equalized in the no-tax caseis r0. The total
welfare of country 1 is ABCD + EFGK2, where CKX = K2G is the flow of
capital. If country 1 then imposes a tax on income received from abroad,
the capital flow will be reduced to, say, HKX = K2M. The net-of-tax rate
of return in the two countries will be equalized at rnet. However, the gross
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the imposition of the tax, country l's total welfare will be AJHD +
PNMK2. Tax revenue is PNQR. Country 1 has given up SFGM, but it
gains PNSE + BJHC. We know that CH = MG, because country l's
capital exports must equal country 2's capital imports, both before and
after the policy change. Therefore, LJHC = QTGM, so country l's gains
outweigh its losses.
If we return to figure 11.1, we can see that similar arguments apply to
country 2—the capital-importing country. For the capital-importing
country, the marginal value product schedule in country 2 is the relevant
marginal revenue schedule. However, the marginal value product of
capital schedule in country 1 represents the average cost schedule to
country 1, since the price paid for capital is determined by the market
price for the last unit of internationally mobile capital. Thus, country 2
faces a marginal cost schedule (MC2 in figure 11.1), and country 2 also has
an incentive to interfere in the capital flow through tax policy. From the
point of view of country 2, this tax policy would attempt to extract the
differential between the two marginal value product schedules. If country
2 were able to impose a tax with no retaliation from country 1, then the
citizens of country 2 would make themselves better off than they were in
the free-trade situation.
The typical outcome in this situation is that each country would retali-
ate to the other's tax, and a postretaliation equilibrium situation would
result. Double taxation treaties are appealing because the participants in
such treaties act to return the world economy closer to the free-trade
situation. It is not always the case, however, that countries are worse off
in a postretaliation equilibrium than they would be in the presence of free
trade. In the case that Hamada considers, where the marginal schedules
are linear, it is always true that both countries are worse off. However,
with nonlinear schedules, it may be possible for a country to be better off
in the postretaliation equilibrium. Consequently, certain countries may
not consider it advantageous to negotiate double taxation treaties with
the United States.
Hamada's piece sheds light on the circumstances under which one can
make a case for double taxation treaties on capital income received from
abroad. In our model we are unable to analyze the issue of retaliation.
However, our capital good flow and capital service flow models do
capture the incentive for one country to intervene, while abstracting from
the issue of retaliation.
11.6 Policy Analyses under Alternative Formulations
of the External Sector
In this section we simulate the effects of several policy proposals, using
the various formulations of the external sector presented in sections 11.2,220 Chapter Eleven
11.3, and 11.4. We consider corporate tax integration (see chapter 8), the
consumption tax (see chapter 9), and various forms of the value-added
tax.
These analyses involve the same numerical specification we have used
throughout. We use the same values for all parameters that do not deal
with the external sector. The various external sector formulations are
incorporated as separate model extensions.
For the sake of brevity, we refer to the four formulations as follows:
1. Constant Elasticity, No Armington. Foreigner's behavior involves
constant elasticity excess demand functions; no Armington heterogeneity
enters; no capital service or capital good flows are considered.
2. Constant Elasticity with Armington. As in (1), except that we also
consider Armington product heterogeneity for imported intermediate
inputs, as described in section 11.2.
3. Capital Services Flows. Flows of capital services take place between
the United States and the rest of the world as described in section 11.3.
4. Capital Goods Flows. Flows of capital goods take place between the
United States and the rest of the world as described in section 11.4.
These formulations are listed in table 11.3, along with the values we
have specified for the more critical parameters. In the case of the first
formulation, we use values for u, of 0.465 and v of —10. These were
discussed in section 6.4. They jointly imply an export price elasticity of
demand of -1.4. For sensitivity analyses in this case, we consider (x and v
set first at 10 and -10 and then at 1 and -1. For the (10, -10) case, the
export price elasticity is -5.5. In the two-good case, as v and (x both
become large (in absolute value), the elasticity of the offer curve
approaches unity; this specification for the foreigner's behavior would
imply that the United States is a small, open, price-taking economy. For
the case of (1, -1), the export price elasticity is -1, and in the two-good
case the elasticity of the offer curve is ». We also consider cases where net
trade flows rather than gross flows enter the benchmark calculation.
For the second formulation, the critical parameters are |x, v, and <TVA-
We take the same |x and v values as for the central case in our first
formulation. vyA is set at 1.7. In our sensitivity runs, 0-^4 is set at 0.5,1.0,
and 3.0.
For the capital service flow and capital good flow formulations, the
critical parameters are EK, Zt, Z2, and Z3, which control substitution in the two cases. The ratio of the endowment of the foreigner to that of the
United States is also an important parameter. Because of our lack of
knowledge about the responsiveness of international capital flows to
differentials in the rate of return, we provide two sets of central case
simulations for each of our formulations with international capital mobil-
ity. In the formulation with capital service flows, we set EK at -0.5 and
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— 0.1, and —4.0). Our central case ratio is 5, and in our sensitivity
analyses we set the ratio at 2 and 10.
A final and important sensitivity analysis in this case involves the return
to capital. In the central case, when foreigners rent to the United States,
they receive PK, the real net-of-tax rental price of capital. PK is paid to the
United States when Americans rent to foreigners. Because of the tax
system in the United States, a differential exists between the marginal
product of capital (the gross-of-tax price) and the net-of-tax return to
capital. Thus, the United States gains if it rents capital services from
abroad, since it collects the marginal product of capital but pays the
net-of-tax return to capital. Conversely, if the United States rents capital
to the foreigner, the United States suffers a loss. To correct for this, we
calculate a tax rate that applies to international capital transactions, and
we use this new rate in one of our sensitivity cases.
For the capital good flow formulation, we provide sensitivity analyses
around two central case values of Zlf namely, 250 and 50. Our central
case values for Z2 and Z3 are 50,000 and 0.5, respectively. For sensitivity
cases we use Zx of 1000,100, and 10, Z2 of 100,000 and Z3 of 0.25 and 1.0.
We also vary the foreigner's capital service endowment, so that it equals 2
times and 10 times the endowment of the United States.
11.6.1 Consumption Tax
In table 11.4 we show model results for a single tax-policy—an 80
percent savings deduction—under the different external sector formula-
tions. This policy, described in detail in chapter 9, represents a move
from the current income tax system toward a consumption tax system.
We adjust marginal income tax rates either additively or multiplicatively
so that the total revenue raised by the government is not altered in any
period by the policy change. All results reported in this chapter come
from sequences of eleven equilibria spaced five years apart.
In our central case, with no Armington good and no capital flows, the
gains from the consumption tax are over $500 billion in present value, or a
little over 1 percent of the total discounted welfare stream. The type of
replacement tax for equal yield does not greatly affect the results. The
Armington formulation does not change things much. The welfare gains
are less by about 15 percent under either additive or multiplicative
scaling. One reason for the similarity among the welfare gain results is
shown in table 11.5. The Armington good does very little to affect the
process of capital accumulation, so that the decrease in the relative price
of capital is nearly identical in the Armington and non-Armington for-
mulations. The results of simulations using these two formulations are
similar in many other ways as well. In each case the decrease in the price
of capital leads to a shift toward the more capital-intensive industries. By
the final period in a consumption tax simulation under the standard,223 Models of the Foreign Sector
Table 11.4 Further Analysis of Adoption
1. Central case—constant elasticity,
no Armington
2. Central case—constant elasticity
with Armington
3. Central cases—capital service flow
A. EK = -1.0
B. EK = -0.5
4. Central cases—capital good flow
A. Zx = 250
B. Zj = 50






























Note: Dynamic welfare effects in present value of compensating variations over time; all
figures in billions of 1973 dollars. The numbers in parentheses represent the gain (or loss) as
a percentage of the present discounted value of consumption plus leisure in the base
sequence ($49 trillion).
no-Armington version, the prices of the various industrial outputs range
from 0.889 for the capital-intensive real estate sector to 0.977 for the
labor-intensive transportation equipment sector. With the Armington
formulation, the comparable prices are 0.890 and 0.977, respectively. A
notable exception under either formulation is the construction industry.
This is one of the more labor-intensive sectors, but its output increases by
more than 11 percent under either formulation, because it is an important
component of investment. The consumption tax causes an increase in
investment demand that is nearly the same under either version. In the
first period, the increase is about 32.8 percent over the base case. By the
eleventh and final period, investment is still 27.9 percent greater than in
the base case.
Much greater changes are evident when we compare our standard
formulation with either of the models with capital flows. However, we
should emphasize that these results are fairly sensitive to the specification
of the parameters controlling the capital flows. To highlight this, we
present two sets of results in tables 11.4 and 11.5, and we will present
further sensitivity analyses in the next subsection. In either the capital
service flow or capital good flow formulations, domestic welfare declines
as the capital flows become more elastic (i.e., as we specify EKor Zx to be
greater in absolute value). In no case are the results very sensitive to the
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tion tax does not cause as great a revenue loss as, say, corporate tax
integration.
For the values of EK that we highlight here (-1.0 and -0.5), the
consumption tax causes the United States to incur substantial service
outflows. As a result of this foreign demand for U.S. capital services, the
relative price of capital drops much less under this variant of the model
than it did in the standard version. Nevertheless, the price of capital does
drop somewhat, and as it drops the rate of capital outflow increases. In
the first period of a simulation with EK = -1.0, using additive replace-
ment, the capital service outflow is under $1 billion. By the eleventh
period, the outflow has swollen to over $50 billion, which is nearly 9
percent of that year's saving. This capital service outflow causes a sub-
stantial welfare loss for these values of EK. (In the next subsection we will
see that a gain can still occur if EK is close enough to zero.) The main
reason for this loss is that the United States incurs substantial capital
service outflows as a result of the policy change, so that the United States
foregoes the gross-of-tax return to capital (capital's marginal product),
but only receives the net-of-tax return.
An interesting policy prescription from this case is that the United
States might gain by having additional taxes on capital income received
from abroad by revoking the foreign tax credit. If the first of these policies
were adopted, the additional tax rates should equal U.S. capital tax rates.
We should note, however, that foreign nations may well retaliate against225 Models of the Foreign Sector
such a policy change on the part of the United States. The possibility of
retaliation reduces the attractiveness of increasing the taxation of capital
income received from abroad. We have made no attempt to model the
complex issue of retaliation. Of course, it is also true that the capital
service flows about which we are concerned are driven by the move
toward a consumption tax. The case for a compensatory tax on capital
income received from abroad is weak if the U.S. does not undertake a
policy of increased stimulus to saving.
Under the first three versions, the domestic capital stock increases very
substantially. By the final period of the consumption tax simulations, the
domestic capital endowment exceeds the base-case endowment by 22.9
percent in the standard model and the Armington model, and 24.7
percent in the capital service flow model (when EK= -1.0). The domes-
tic economy gains in the first two cases because all of that capital is used at
home. In the capital service flow version, a great deal of it is used abroad.
The results are somewhat different for the capital good flow version of the
model. In this case, the domestic capital stock barely grows at all. By the
final period of the sequence, the domestic capital endowment is only 2.7
percent greater than in the base case. The reason for this is that domestic
consumers hold a great deal of foreign capital. In the case of Zx = 250,
domestic consumers devote 8 percent of their saving in the first period to
saving abroad. By the eleventh period, these purchases of foreign capital
have grown to nearly 25 percent of saving, and the rental payments on the
accumulated foreign capital amount to 2.6 percent of national income.
These capital flows are very substantial and may strike some readers as
being rather high. This is why we have also chosen to highlight the results
from simulations with Zt = 50. In this case, in the first period, domestic
consumers only use a bit more than 2 percent of their saving to purchase
foreign capital. By the eleventh period, they still only spend about 16
percent of their saving for foreign capital, despite the fact that the
differential between foreign and domestic rates of return is much greater
than it was in the simulation with Z1 — 250. If the lower value of Zx is
considered to be more realistic, then the consumption tax is a gaining
proposition under the capital good flow formulation.
11.6.2 Sensitivity Analysis for Consumption Tax Results
In table 11.6 we report our sensitivity analyses for our two constant
elasticity formulations. Given that the central case versions are rather
similar, it may not be surprising that similar results emerge from the
sensitivity cases. Neither the choice of the |x - v combination, nor the
specification of gross or net trade flows makes very much difference to the
no-Armington case. In the model with Armington goods, the elasticity of
substitution between value added and the Armington good does not226 Chapter Eleven
Table 11.6 Sensitivity Analysis of Consumption Tax for Constant Elasticity
Formulations
1. Central case—constant elasticity,
no Armington, with |A = .465, v = -10
2. Constant elasticity, no Armington, with
ix = 10, v = -10
3. Constant elasticity, no Armington, with
4. Constant elasticity, no Armington, with net
rather than gross trade flow analysis,
,x = .465, v = -10





Note: Dynamic welfare effects in present value of compensating variations over time; all
figures in billions of 1973 dollars. The numbers in parentheses represent the gain (or loss) as



























































make much difference. One reason for this is that the imported resource
does not represent a very large proportion of total factor inputs.
4
In tables 11.7 and 11.8, we report our sensitivity analysis of the con-
sumption tax results for our capital service and capital goods flow for-
mulations. For the capital service flow formulation, we change EK from
-1.0 to 0.0, -0.1, and -4.0. We also vary the endowment ratios
between 2 and 10. Clearly, our results are very sensitive to the value of EK
and somewhat sensitive to the size of the endowment ratio. If we believe
that the capital service flow version is the correct model to use, then our
ultimate assessment of the value of adopting a consumption tax will
4. When the price of capital decreases, as it does in all of these simulations, the price of
value-added composite also drops. This gives an incentive to substitute away from the
imported resource, with the degree of the response controlled by uVA R. When this elasticity
of substitution is 0.5, very little change occurs. However, in our other cases, the change is
enough to lead to decreases of a few percentage points in the price of the imported resource.227 Models of the Foreign Sector
Table 11.7 Sensitivity Analysis of Consumption Tax for the Capital Service
Flow Formulation
I. EK = -1.0, endowment ratio = 2
2. EK - -1.0, endowment ratio = 5
3. EK = -1.0, endowment ratio = 10
4. EK = -1.0, endowment ratio = 4, foreigner
pays gross-of-tax rental rate
5. EK = -0.5, endowment ratio = 2
6. EK = -0.5, endowment ratio = 5
7. EK = -0.5, endowment ratio = 10
8. EK = -0.5, endowment ratio = 5, foreigner
pays gross-of-tax rental rate
9. EK = 0.0, endowment ratio = 5
10. EK = -0.1, endowment ratio = 5
II. EK = -4.0, endowment ratio = 5
Note: Dynamic welfare effects in present value of compensating variations over time; all
figures in billions of 1973 dollars. The numbers in parentheses represent the gain (or loss) as
a percentage of the present discounted value of consumption plus leisure in the base
sequence.




















































depend upon the value we choose for EK. We have highlighted the results
f or EK = -1.0 and EK = -0.5, under each of which the consumption tax
is a losing proportion. However, table 11.7 indicates that if the value is
close enough to zero, enough of the new capital stays at home that United
States consumers benefit.
As can be seen from rows 4 and 8 of table 11.7, the results change
dramatically when the foreigner is required to pay the gross-of-tax rental
price of capital. The substantial losses in rows 1 and 5 become substantial
welfare gains under this alternative model, as explained above. This
result clearly demonstrates the possibility that the United States could
gain by instituting a compensatory tax on capital income received from
abroad. However, we must repeat three warnings for those who would
advocate such a tax. First, these results arise only in this version of the228 Chapter Eleven
model. Second, they occur only when we study a consumption tax. Third,
we have ignored the possibility of retaliation.
For our capital good formulation, we report only sensitivity analyses on
Zx and the endowment ratio in table 11.8, because under the consump-
tion tax, the United States saves abroad, but no foreign saving occurs in
the United States. Consequently, Z2 and Z3 are immaterial in this case.
However, they have an effect in the integration cases reported below,
where the capital good flow is in the opposite direction. Table 11.8
reveals that our results are rather sensitive to the value of Zx, but are
quite insensitive to the endowment ratio values.
The consumption tax results certainly raise the possibility that a tax
policy that appears to improve efficiency in a model of a closed economy
may reduce efficiency in a model with an open world capital market. The
intertemporal efficiency gains implied by the move to a consumption tax
are more than offset by the misallocation of capital between the domestic











11.8 Sensitivity Analysis of Consumption Tax for the
Formulation
Zx = 250, endowment ratio =
Zx = 250, endowment ratio =
Zx = 250, endowment ratio =
Zx = 50, endowment ratio =
Zx = 50, endowment ratio =
Zx = 50, endowment ratio =
Zj = 10, endowment ratio =
Zj = 100, endowment ratio -
























































Note: Dynamic welfare effects in present value of compensating variations over time; all
figures in billions of 1973 dollars. The numbers in parentheses represent the gain (or loss) as
a percentage of the present discounted value of consumption plus leisure in the base
sequence ($49 trillion).
"These results were reported earlier in table 11.4.229 Models of the Foreign Sector
capital flows are zero in the base case and that the corporation income tax
is left in place. The new saving incentives created by the adoption of a
consumption tax induce individuals to save abroad where the social rate
of return is lower than for domestic investments. The corporation income
tax is the primary cause of this misallocation.
The sensitivity of our open-economy results to our capital flow elastic-
ity parameters argues that these figures should be the subject of econo-
metric investigation. While we have not pursued such a course ourselves,
we hope that the profession can narrow the range of reasonable estimates
so that the model's predictions can be made with more precision and
confidence.
11.6.3 Corporate Tax Integration
In table 11.9 we present further analyses of corporate and personal tax
integration in the United States, using the alternative external sector
variants. Under the standard variant of the model, this policy produces
gains of $418 billion with additive replacement and $311 billion with
multiplicative replacement. These gains are between 0.5 and 1 percent of




1. Central case—constant elasticity, $418.2 $310.6
no Armington
2. Central case—constant elasticity
with Armington
3. Capital service flow version
A. EK = 0.5
B. EK = -1.0
4. Capital good flow version
A. Z2 = 50,000; Z3 = 0.5
B. Z2 = 100,000; Z3 = 0.5
C. Z2 = 50,000; Z3 = 0.25
D. Z2 = 50,000; Z3 = 1.0
Note: Dynamic welfare effects in present value of compensating variations over time; all
figures in billions of 1973 dollars. The numbers in parentheses represent the gain (or loss) as













































Changes in the Relative Price of Capital as a Result of Integration





























































Note: All results based on additive replacement for equal revenue yield.
the total present discounted value of welfare. The results are virtually
identical for the Armington version of the model. This is true not only for
the aggregate welfare measure, but also for many of the detailed results.
One can see from table 11.10 that the paths for the relative price of capital
are very similar in the two cases.
Once again, it is the capital service flow version of the model that is the
least similar to the other versions. With capital service flows, the welfare
gains from integration are very large, in excess of 2.5 percent of total
welfare. In this case the United States rents capital services from abroad,
because integration results in an increase in the price of capital. This
contrasts with the consumption tax case. Residents of the United States
gain significantly from this transaction, since they pay the net-of-tax
return. These rentals are very large. By the final equilibrium period, they
amount to nearly $100 billion, compared with the rental value of the
domestic capital stock of about $660 billion. These substantial supplies of
capital from abroad are the reason that the relative price of capital
services increases so much less under this version of the model than under
all of the other versions. However, this does not appear to affect domestic
capital accumulation very greatly. The incremental saving brought about
by the policy change is about 80 percent as great in the capital service flow
version as in the standard version. (In each case, the incremental saving is
less than half as great for the policy of integration as for the consumption
tax.)
Because the price of capital services does not rise as far under the
capital service flow version, there are some differences among the model231 Models of the Foreign Sector
variants in the sectoral allocation of production. Under the standard
version of the model, the relative outputs of lightly taxed, capital-
intensive industries such as agriculture and real estate are reduced for two
reasons. First, these industries are less attractive after the tax changes
because they now shoulder a relatively greater portion of the tax burden.
Second, they suffer because of the relative increase in the price of capital
services. Under the capital service flow version of the model, the second
of these effects is greatly reduced, such that agriculture retains its share of
output almost completely, and real estate only suffers about two-thirds as
great a relative drop as under the standard version of the model. Similar
reasoning would imply that heavily taxed, labor-intensive industries
would increase their relative output and that the increase would be
greater under the standard version of the model. Indeed, this occurs in
many industries.
In table 11.9 we also provide sensitivity analysis on the welfare gains
from corporate tax integration in the capital goods flow model. The
parameters Z2 and Z3 control the strength of the capital inflow response
to the increase in the price of capital in the United States. For values of Z2
and Z3, which seemed to us to provide believable responses by the
foreigner, integration always causes a large welfare gain. Our reading of
table 11.9 is that, despite some sensitivity to the values of these param-
eters, integration under the capital good version seems to yield gains in
the neighborhood of 1 percent of the total present value of welfare.
11.6.4 Value-Added Tax
In table 11.11 we present results from our analyses of four different
forms of value-added tax for the United States. We model an origin-
based VAT as an equal-rate factor tax on both primary factors and a
destination-based tax as an equal-rate final sales tax on expenditures in
the United States. Under the income-type VAT, all goods are taxed,
while only current consumption goods are taxed under the consumption-
type VAT. We model the latter feature through a saving deduction for the
origin-based VAT of the consumption type. In the case of the destination-
based VAT, we model an income-type tax as a tax on all sixteen consumer
goods and a consumption-type tax as a tax on the fifteen consumer goods
other than saving. We impose equal revenue yield through additive or
multiplicative scaling of the income tax. Since the VAT leads to an
increase in revenue, the equal yield tax changes are decreases in personal
tax rates. Therefore, the gains from the various types of VAT are greater
(or the losses smaller) under multiplicative replacement. This contrasts
with both integration and the consumption tax, under which tax increases
were necessary in order to preserve yield equality. Not only does multi-
plicative replacement lead to better outcomes than additive replacement

























































































































Note: Dynamic wefare effects in present value of compensating variations over time; in
billions of 1973 dollars. The numbers in parentheses represent the gain (or loss) as a
percentage of the present discounted value of consumption plus leisure in the base sequence
($49 trillion).
percent VAT that we consider here, the tax reductions for equal yield are
very substantial. In the case of the income-type VATs, marginal income
tax rates are reduced by about 40 percent (for multiplicative replace-
ment) and about ten percentage points (for additive replacement). For
the consumption-type VATs, the rate reductions are about 35 percent
and nine percentage points. This is the general order of magnitude of the
tax changes for equal yield in all periods for all formulations of the model.
Of course, if we were to consider a smaller VAT, the rate reductions
would be smaller and the difference between additive and multiplicative
replacement would not be as great. We restrict our attention here to 10
percent VATs for purposes of simplicity.233 Models of the Foreign Sector
The changes in welfare resulting from the VAT are relatively small
when compared with the results of corporate tax integration or the
consumption tax. Whereas the latter changes remove some of the most
heavily distortionary portions of the tax system, the VAT is designed to
be a nondistortionary tax, except for the effects on labor supply and
saving. Therefore, in the versions of the model with no international
capital flows, the main welfare improvements come from the reductions
in marginal income tax rates or from the reduction in intertemporal
distortion resulting from the consumption-type VAT. The neutrality
between the origin basis and the destination basis holds exactly for the
formulations with no capital goods, and nearly so for the other cases.
In the versions of the model with no international capital flows, and in
the capital good flow case, the welfare gains resulting from the income-
type VAT runs are generally smaller than those resulting from the corre-
sponding consumption-type VAT simulations. The gains are smaller
because the income-type VAT inefficiently distorts individuals' consump-
tion-saving decisions more than the consumption-type VAT, since the
former tax applies to investment goods (as well as consumption goods)
and in effect taxes saving. For instance, in the standard version of the
model with additive replacement, the consumption-type VAT leads to a
6.6 percent increase in saving in the first period, while the income-type
VAT causes a 7 percent decrease. These patterns continue in later
periods. These changes in saving behavior lead to predictable changes in
the relative price of capital. In the case of the income-type VAT, this
price rises from about 1.009 in the first period to about 1.054 in the
eleventh equilibrium. The consumption-type VAT causes the price of
capital to fall from 1.004 to 0.965. These changes are small compared to
those caused by the consumption tax on corporate tax integration but
they do help explain the welfare results in the VAT simulations.
There is one exception to this general result. In the capital service flow
case, the gains under an income-type VAT are larger than under the
consumption-type VAT. Because of the movements of the relative price
of capital, capital is rented to the United States under the income-type tax
and from the United States under the consumption-type tax. Since, as
discussed earlier, those offering capital overseas receive only the net-of-
tax price of capital as compensation, the direction of the capital service
flow is favorable to the United States under the income-type VAT, and
unfavorable to the United States under the consumption-type VAT. The
favorable effect under the income-type tax more than compensates for
any adverse impact related to the tax's distortion of consumption-saving
decisions.
The results of table 11.11 show that a consumption-type VAT is welfare
improving in the open capital markets formulations, whereas earlier we
saw that a consumption tax implemented as an 80 percent savings deduc-234 Chapter Eleven
tion reduces welfare in the same environment. The difference in results
can be attributed to the fact that saving is still taxed under the VAT
(although at a reduced rate after the equal yield adjustments), and to the
fact that the incidence of a VAT differs from that of an expenditure tax.
The high-bracket households, those who do most of the saving, have far
more incentive to increase savings with the expenditure tax, given our
specifications of the two experiments. Therefore, our VAT simulations
entail much smaller capital outflows and social loss.
We view the value-added tax as it exists today as a particular European
response to European problems of tax administration and the structural
objectives of international economic integration in the EEC. What is not
clear is whether the European experience is especially relevant to the
problems of the United States. It does not seem that foreign trade
concerns provide a legitimate reason for the United States to introduce a
VAT. We have seen that the concern over the difference between origin-
based and destination-based taxes is somewhat misplaced. In addition,
there is no need to tie an origin or destination basis to a particular type of
tax. For example, if the United States wanted to countervail the destina-
tion-based VAT in the EEC with a destination-based tax in the United
States, that could be done equally well with a destination-based retail
sales tax. Nevertheless, the results in table 11.11 indicate that a consump-
tion-type VAT leads to welfare gains under every one of the foreign trade
formulations. They indicate that a broadly based VAT that replaces
existing distortions is worth considering.
11.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we have described four alternative external sector
formulations that can be used to represent external sector behavior in our
general equilibrium tax model for the United States. We consider two
formulations of merchandise trade behavior using constant elasticity
excess demand functions for the behavior of the foreign sector. We also
consider internationally mobile capital service and capital goods.
Under these different formulations, we reinvestigate two policy
alternatives considered in earlier chapters: consumption tax and integra-
tion of the personal and corporate income taxes.
Our results indicate that the different external sector formulations
make some difference to the results of our model. The most pronounced
changes result from the capital service flow formulations. Each of the
policies that we investigated appears to have the potential to generate
substantial capital service flows between the United States and abroad.
When the net flow is from the U.S. to foreigners, the United States is
adversely affected since those offering capital receive only the net-of-tax
rental price.